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Early this year saw the successful conclusion of the European Stability Mechanism’s 
financial assistance programme to help provide for the ongoing clean-up, restructuring 
and recapitalisation of those domestic credit institutions (CIs) that had been most adversely 
affected by the economic situation and by the tensions on financial markets, and to thus 
restore their financing capacity to normal and to build up their economic activity-supporting 
function. In exchange for their recapitalisation using public funds, these banks were 
required to undertake restructuring or resolution processes, obliging them to scale back 
their activity, thus limiting their capacity to finance new projects.
The aim of this article is to analyse the impact that the adjustment plans of the banks 
recapitalised with public funds may have had on the overall supply of credit to non-financial 
corporations in Spain. In this connection, the source of the plans and the banks involved 
are first recalled. Next, the adjustment made by these banks in recent months – compared 
with that observed at other institutions not affected – is shown, and the weight of their 
loans to companies relative to total corporate credit extended by banks in Spain is 
assessed. Finally, a quantitative estimate is made of the effect that the adjustment plans 
may have had on the total aggregate supply of lending to corporations. This effect depends 
not only on the relative weight of the lending extended by the banks affected by the plans, 
but also on the possibilities that the companies concerned may have had to replace this 
lending with other loans granted by banks that have not been subject to such plans.
The terms of the financial assistance to the Spanish banking sector were laid down in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 20 July 2012. The MoU set out three 
main courses of action:
— Determination of each bank’s capital needs, through an asset quality review 
and a stress test.
— Recapitalisation, restructuring and/or resolution of ailing banks, identified on 
the basis of the capital needs detected.
— Segregation and transfer to an external entity (Sareb) of real estate-related 
assets by the banks receiving State aid.
The results of the capital needs calculated by an external consultant, bank by bank, were 
made public on 28 September 2012. On this basis, the banks analysed were divided into 
several groups:
— Group 0: includes those not evidencing a capital shortfall.
— Group 1: comprising banks that were majority-controlled by the FROB before 
the exercise to evaluate capital needs.
— Group 2: banks with a capital shortfall, and without the possibility of redressing 
this privately and without State aid.
Introduction
Restructuring plans
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— Group 3: banks with a capital shortfall, but with reliable private plans for 
recapitalisation and without any need for State aid.
Table 1 shows the CIs belonging to each of these groups. Both those in Group 1 and in Group 
2 required State aid, albeit to differing degrees, and therefore had to submit restructuring or 
resolution plans and obtain the related approval from both national and European authorities. 
The aim pursued with these plans was threefold: to ensure the bank’s long-term viability 
without additional State aid (or to provide for its orderly resolution, through liquidation or sale, 
were it considered non-viable); to minimise the burden for taxpayers; and to soften the 
potentially distorting effects on competition arising from assistance being granted.
To attain these goals, the plans laid down a series of restrictions on banks, including a reduction 
of 10%-50% (depending on each individual case) in their balance sheets from 2012 to 2017. 
The percentage required of each bank was proportional to the significance of the assistance 
received and a portion of that percentage would come about as a result of the obligatory 
transfer to Sareb of real estate-related assets (in December 2012 for the Group 1 banks, and 
in February 2013 for the Group 2 banks). Further, the plans generally required the withdrawal 
from activities other than the traditional retail banking business and the discontinuation of all 
operations outside the regions of origin of each institution. In principle, then, the impact should 
be greater on wholesale activities, with large corporations and in the real estate sector.
The plans for the Group 1 banks were approved by the European Commission on 28 November 
2012, and for the Group 2 banks on 20 December that same year. Generally, they will be in 
force for five years (to 2017).
Banks subject to restructuring plans have already adjusted their size and business volume 
most significantly. Chart 1 compares total assets, lending to customers and numbers of 
offices and employees from December 2011 to March 2014, for the banks belonging to 
Recent adjustment
at banks undergoing 
restructuring
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Group 3 Ibercaja
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CLASSIFICATION OF SPANISH INSTITUTIONS IN THE 2012 ASSESSMENT EXERCISE TABLE 1 
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Groups 1 and 2 and for all other CIs. In all instances, the adjustment has been significantly 
greater at institutions subject to restructuring plans. Regarding the number of staff and 
offices, while these had already been slightly reduced earlier, the difference is seen 
essentially from March 2013, i.e. shortly after the entry into force of the plans at the end of 
the previous year. Conversely, in total assets and in lending to customers (which includes 
loans to the public sector and to the private sector other than CIs), the behaviour of the 
Group 1 and 2 banks was already notably different from the rest before the plans were 
implemented, most probably due to their different financial position. However, in both 
cases the contraction occurred mainly from the second half of 2012. The decline in 
December that year for the Group 1 banks, and in March of the following year for the 
Group 2 banks, was largely due to the mandatory transfer to Sareb of virtually all foreclosed 
assets and of the loans granted for real estate construction and development held by 
these banks. It should also be borne in mind that an influential factor in reducing the Group 
2 CIs’ balance sheets was the sale in late 2013 of almost one-third of the business of 
Banco Mare Nostrum. 
In principle, the adjustment required of banks that received State aid might pose an added 
obstacle to the growth of lending to households and firms. In practice, the significance of 
this effect depends, first, on the weight of the institutions subject to constraints in the total 
lending extended to these sectors; and, further, on the possibilities of replacing the 
constrained lending with that offered by other banks not subject to restructuring. Indeed, 
Relative market weight of 
financing to non-financial 
corporations
in Spain
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Includes loans to general government and to the private sector, except CIs.
CHART 1CREDIT INSTITUTIONS UNDER RESTRUCTURING COMPARED 
Dec 2011 = 100 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12  Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13  Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar-14 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12  Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13  Sep-13 Dec-13
 
Mar-14
 
Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12  Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13  Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar-14 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12  Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13  Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar-14
 GROUP 1  GROUP 2  OTHER CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
  
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
NUMBER OF OFFICES 
  
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
TOTAL ASSETS 
  
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
LENDING TO CUSTOMERS (a) 
  
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY-AUGUST 2014 IMPACT OF RESTRUCTURING PLANS ON LENDING TO NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
it should be borne in mind that those companies or households that may have seen their 
availability of funds reduced as a result of the limitations imposed by the plans in force may 
resort to other banks, not restricted by the plans, to obtain loans. Were they to obtain from 
the latter the funds they ceased to receive from the former, the restructuring plans would 
not have any effect on the overall supply of credit. Nonetheless, the possibility of replacing 
one lender with another is more complicated when there is not enough information on the 
financial situation of the borrower, a circumstance which tends to arise with increasing 
frequency in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which precisely for 
this reason are usually more dependent on their habitual lenders.
Table 2 shows the relative weight of the banks subject to restructuring plans in the overall 
supply of lending to non-financial corporations by all Spanish CIs. This relative weight is 
calculated both in terms of the number of borrowing corporations and of the volume of 
financing obtained by all these corporations. The institutions that received State aid are in 
three groups: MoU Group 1 banks, excluding Banco de Valencia;1 Group 2 banks; and banks 
absorbed. This latter group includes Banco de Valencia and another two FROB-controlled 
banks that received State aid but which did not participate directly in the exercises assessing 
capital needs given their foreseen acquisition by other banks (Banco CAM, absorbed by 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Excluding Banco de Valencia, absorbed by Caixabank in July 2013.
b Includes, in adddition to Banco de Valencia, Banco CAM and Unnim.
c The sum of the weights of the three groups may exceed the total since a single corporation may receive lending from institutions from more than one group.
Group 1 (a) Group 2
Institutions 
absorbed (b)
Total institutions under 
restructuring
Percentage of corporations with lending from institutions under 
restructuring (c)
    September 2012 18.0 7.2 6.9 28.9
    March 2014 16.4 6.6 0.0 22.2
Percentage of lending from institutions under restructuring relative 
to total lending
    September 2012 14.1 2.1 2.9 19.1
    March 2014 11.5 2.2 0.0 13.7
Percentage of corporations (September 2012) (c)
    100%-dependent 6.5 2.4 2.1 11.4
    > 75%-dependent 8.1 3.0 2.7 14.3
    > 50%-dependent 10.0 3.8 3.4 17.6
    > 25%-dependent 13.0 5.0 4.5 22.3
    > 0%-dependent 18.0 7.2 6.9 28.9
Percentage of lending (September 2012)
    100%-dependent 4.3 0.6 0.5 5.7
    > 75%-dependent 5.4 1.0 1.4 8.2
    > 50%-dependent 7.1 1.2 1.6 10.9
    > 25%-dependent 9.5 1.4 1.9 14.5
    > 0%-dependent 14.1 2.1 2.9 19.1
WEIGHT OF LENDING GRANTED BY INSTITUTIONS UNDER RESTRUCTURING TABLE 2 
  
1  Banco de Valencia is excluded from Group 1 owing to its absorption by Caixabank in July 2013.
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Banco de Sabadell in December 2012, and Unnim, absorbed by BBVA in June 2013). The 
banks absorbed were also subject to capacity-adjustment requirements owing to the 
assistance received. But the impact on the supply of credit is likely to have differed 
precisely because they were absorbed by banks that were not subject to this type of 
constraint and which, during the absorption process, may also have had access to the 
information that these absorbed banks already had on their borrower corporations.
If the “dependent corporations” of the banks under restructuring are defined as all those 
which had one or more loans outstanding with those banks (irrespective of their amount), 
these dependent corporations accounted, in September 2012, for 29% of the total non-
financial corporations in Spain and for 19% of the total lending extended to the corporate 
sector. These percentages, while significant, highlight the minority nature within the overall 
Spanish credit system of these corporations. The companies dependent on the Group 1 
CIs showed the highest proportions, accounting for 18% and 14% of total corporations 
and of total outstanding loans to corporations, respectively.
From the standpoint of corporations, it is also important to consider the relative weight of 
the loans granted by banks subject to restructuring plans in the total funds received by the 
corporation. More specifically, corporations in which the weight of such loans was smaller 
were already operating to a significant extent in September 2012 with other CIs not subject 
to restrictions. Consequently, their capacity to replace one lender bank with another was 
conceivably greater.
As Table 2 shows, when this relevant information is taken into account, the potential 
impact of the restructuring plans diminishes further. Thus, for instance, corporations that 
received more than 50% of their financing from banks under restructuring account for only 
18% of total corporations and the lending received accounts for 11% of the total 
outstanding balance of loans to corporations.
To analyse the potential impact of the adjustment plans on lending to non-financial 
corporations, it should first be considered how lending would have performed had such 
plans not existed. To this end, this article estimates a simple model which relates changes 
in lending2 at the level of the individual companies to its main determinants, combining the 
information on the outstanding balance of loans to each company from the Central Credit 
Register (CCR) with the information on their results and financial position from the Banco 
de España’s integrated database (CBI).3 4 The model includes: sectoral variables (up to two 
digits of the 2009 CNAE classification); company size (large, medium-sized, small and 
micro-enterprise); the existence of doubtful and written-off loans; and other variables 
indicative of a company’s economic and financial position, such as its debt level, profitability 
and the growth in its sales and headcount.5 By adding to this model a variable that is equal 
An assessment
of the impact of the 
restructuring plans
2  Along the lines of the exercise explained in Box 6.1 of the Banco de España 2012 Annual Report, which analysed 
lending by institutions over the period 2010-12.
3  The CBI combines the data from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey (CBA), which mostly 
includes large and medium-sized companies, with the data from company registers (CBB) which include mainly 
small companies. Overall, when combined with the CCR data, information is available on approximately 400,000 
companies.
4  The CCR provides data on drawn and undrawn credit balances, including loans on balance sheet and loans 
written off. This definition is a better reflection of total financing actually received by companies.
5  All the control variables refer to the initial period (September 2012 for the CCR data and 2012 or 2011 for the CBI 
data) to avoid problems of endogeneity and reverse causality. The fit of the equation is, in any event, very low (R2 
= 2%), reflecting the significance of company-specific data in corporations’ demand for funds. Nevertheless, in 
general, the coefficients of the control variables have the expected signs and are significant.
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to 1 if the company depends on CIs under restructuring and to 0 if it does not, it is possible to 
estimate the effect derived from that dependence, i.e. the effect the constraints imposed 
by the restructuring plans have on the resultant supply. Moreover, as what is analysed is 
the total lending received by the company (and not just that extended by CIs under 
restructuring), it is important to note that this method of estimating the effect of the plans 
already takes account of the possibility of one lender being replaced by another.
The first three rows of Table 3 show the effects estimated for the three groups of CIs under 
restructuring identified in the previous section. In the case of companies that have received 
funds from Group 1 banks, the adjustment plans can be seen to have exerted a 
contractionary effect, as loans are lower (2.6%) than at equivalent companies that do not 
depend on banks under restructuring. Nevertheless, the table also shows that the effect is 
not significant for companies that depend on absorbed banks, and that it is even slightly 
positive for companies that lend from Group 2 institutions. The points mentioned above in 
respect of the absorbed institutions (for instance, the soundness of the absorbing banks 
and their access to the information held by the absorbed institutions on their borrowers), 
together with the fewer constraints imposed on Group 2 institutions, most likely explain 
these different results by group of banks. 
Consequently, quantification of the possible contractionary effect of the restructuring 
plans should be confined to the group of companies that received lending from Group 1 
institutions. As the relative weight of the lending extended by those banks in the overall 
supply of credit to companies was 14.1% in September 2012 (see Table 2), the overall 
contractionary effect of the restructuring plans on lending to non-financial corporations in 
Spain (between September 2012 and March 2014) can be estimated at approximately 
0.4% (i.e. 2.65% x 0.141). However, this figure probably overstates the contractionary 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Obtained from a model that explains the change in the outstanding balance of lending granted between September 2012 and March 2014, controlling for the 
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Coefjcient P-Ualue
Group 1-dependent corporation -2.654 0.000
Group 2-dependent corporation 0.704 0.002
Corporation dependent on absorbed banJs under restructuring -1 0.16
Group 1-dependent corporation. +ess than 25% -1 0.000
Group 1-dependent corporation.  25%-50% -4.47 0.000
Group 1-dependent corporation.  50%-75% -5.6 0.000
Group 1-dependent corporation.  75%-100% -7 0.011
Group 1-dependent corporation.  +arge -2.76 0.17
Group 1-dependent corporation.  Medium-siYed -2.51 0.000
Group 1-dependent corporation.  Small-siYed -247 0.000
Group 1-dependent corporation.  Micro-enterprise -2.57 0.000
Group 1-dependent corporation.  Construction and real estate serUices -1.777 0.056
Group 1-dependent corporation.  Other sectors -5 0.000
ESTIMATION OF THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT ON LENDING TO CORPORATIONS ARISING FROM 
DEPENDENCE ON CREDIT INSTITUTIONS UNDER RESTRUCTURING (a) (b)  
TABLE 3 
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effect, as the exercise performed takes no account of the overall positive impact on 
investor confidence of the recapitalisation and restructuring of the Spanish financial 
system, which affects all banks, not only those under restructuring.
The next three rows of Table 3 show how this estimated effect differs considerably from 
company to company, according to their degree of dependence, size and industry. In 
particular, the impact is greater in companies whose dependence on Group 1 CIs was 
between 25% and 75% in September 2012. Where the degree of dependence was less 
than 25%, the contraction in lending was lower, as was to be expected given that these 
companies were foreseeably more likely to replace this lending with lending from other 
institutions, since an already significant portion of their lending already came from other 
CIs that were not subject to restructuring plans. At the opposite end of the scale, the 
smaller decline in lending that was also observed at companies where more than 75% of 
bank financing came from Group 1 CIs might be explained by the banks’ own interest in 
continuing to finance companies, within the limits allowed by the restructuring plans, with 
which they did most business and on which they would foreseeably have more information.6
By size, the estimated effects are similar in amount, but they would be statistically 
significant for SMEs while not so for large corporations. Lastly, the sharpest decline in 
lending extended would have been at companies other than those in the real estate 
construction and development sectors. It should be borne in mind here that in the 
information used (taken from the CCR) and in contrast to Chart 1, the loans transferred 
from institutions to Sareb remain as loans of the originator institutions, which skews the 
contractionary effect to the downside.
As indicated, this estimated reduction in lending as a result of the restructuring plans is the 
outcome, on one hand, of the fewer funds lent by the Group 1 CIs, but, on the other, it also 
reflects the extent to which the companies affected have been capable of replacing these 
institutions with others as fund-suppliers. In a world in which this substitutability between 
lender banks were perfect, both effects would have cancelled each other out. Accordingly, 
the fact that a non-zero impact is found indicates that substitutability has not been perfect. 
In practice, although there is obviously leeway to carry out this substitution since the bulk 
of the Spanish financial system has not received any State aid and nor has it been subject 
to adjustment plans, there are also frictions – related to the above-mentioned information 
problems – that restrict substitution.
Chart 2 illustrates the actual scope of replacing certain lenders with others. The left-hand 
panel depicts three measures of the annual decline in lending for corporations dependent 
on the Group 1 CIs.7 The difference of almost 9 pp (in March 2014) between the financing 
granted by Group 1 banks (see blue line) and that which the dependent corporations 
should have received, according to the estimated model, in the event of their not having 
depended on these banks, reflects the contraction in supply by the institutions subject to 
restructuring plans. That said, the chart also reveals that the decline in total lending actually 
received by these dependent corporations (see red line) is less than the decline in funds 
exclusively from the Group 1 institutions (blue line). This indicates that these dependent 
6  Moreover, given that large corporations generally diversify their sources of bank financing across several 
institutions, 97.8% of the companies that receive more than 75% of their lending from Group 1 CIs are small 
companies or micro-enterprises. This helps to explain the results, as the restructuring plans impose fewer 
constraints on lending to SMEs than to large corporations.
7  Given the diversity of individual results, in each case the median of the rate of change among the Group 
1-dependent corporations is depicted.
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corporations may have replaced a portion of the funds that they have not received from 
their habitual lenders. The ratio between this substituted portion and substitution needs 
offers some idea of the degree of substitutability between lenders.
For the whole of the period considered, the substitution ratio is 70%.8 It is worth observing 
how the cumulative decline in lending increases over time in the three lines in the chart, but 
differently so. In the first six months, the reduction in total lending observed is similar to 
that stemming from Group 1, indicating a very low substitution ratio (25%). However, over 
time, corporations’ capacity to find other bank lending suppliers has improved.
Furthermore, the right-hand panel of Chart 2 shows the results for different sub-sets of 
dependent corporations. It is telling how the Group 1 institutions cut their lending essentially 
to the least dependent companies (by close to 40%), in a possible attempt to retaining in 
this way their business with the companies with which they had a closer relationship. 
Nonetheless, the effect on these less dependent companies’ overall availability of funds 
was low thanks to their high substitution ratio (92%). In terms of the size of the borrowers, 
the substitution ratio was 60% for micro-enterprises, while it hovered around 80% for 
SMEs.9 Finally, at corporations in the construction and real estate services sectors, the 
contraction in lending by the Group 1 institutions (which does not include the decline 
arising from the transfer of loans to Sareb) was significantly less than at the rest, but their 
substitution ratio was only 28%, denoting a lesser readiness of lenders to assume 
additional risks in relation to the real estate market.
The difficulties faced by a part of the Spanish financial system in withstanding independently 
the consequences of the recent economic and financial crisis led to the need to inject 
public funds in the form of capital into these institutions. In exchange, these institutions 
Conclusions
SOURCE: Banco de España
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8  Rounding aside, this gives a decline of 20% in the lending by the Group 1 CIs, of 14% in total lending observed 
and of 11.3% in the theoretical amount: -14 -(-20)/-11.3-(-20). 
9  A figure is not shown for large corporations since the differential effect is not significant.
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had to subject themselves to restructuring or resolution plans limiting their permitted range 
of activities and entailing a reduction in the size of their balance sheets.
This article has reviewed the recent adjustment made by the institutions that received 
State aid and the impact this may have had on the overall supply of lending to corporations. 
Particular attention is paid to the possibility that some of the companies affected may have 
replaced a portion of the funds they have ceased to receive from the institutions subject to 
plans with loans from other institutions that have not been affected by such plans.
The analysis shows that Spanish companies have been able to compensate for a significant 
portion of the contraction in the supply of loans associated with the restructuring plans. 
Substitutability, however, has not been perfect and the greater difficulties involved in 
replacing certain loans with others have affected SMEs more.
On the estimates made, the aggregate impact of the restructuring plans on total lending to 
non-financial corporations as a whole may be quantified, with all the necessary caution the 
procedures used call for, at around 0.4 pp of total lending between September 2012 and 
March 2014.
This estimate envisages only the direct, specific impact of the restructuring plans and 
does not take into account the positive effect that the clean-up, recapitalisation and 
restructuring of the Spanish banking system has had on restoring investor confidence, on 
normalising the access by all Spanish institutions to financing and, therefore, indirectly, on 
developments in lending.
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